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Survey	evidence:	Europeans	support	the	EU’s	hard
line	in	the	Brexit	negotiations
The	British	government	has	been	frustrated	by	the	hard	negotiating	line	pursued	by	the	EU	under
the	lead	of	Michel	Barnier,	and	the	unusual	degree	of	unity	in	supporting	the	EU’s	Brexit	negotiation
strategy	has	surprised	quite	a	few	observers.	Drawing	on	recent	survey	evidence,	Stefanie
Walter	reflects	on	the	Brexit	process	through	EU-27	eyes,	and	concludes	that	by	and	large
Europeans	support	the	EU’s	negotiating	strategy.
So	far,	there	has	been	remarkable	unity	among	EU	member	states	over	Brexit.	While	the
unwillingness	of	EU-27	governments	to	break	ranks	has	a	variety	of	sources,	one	possible	explanation	is	public
opinion	in	the	remaining	member	states.	Surprisingly,	although	there	has	been	extensive	polling	on	what	the
British	public	thinks	about	Brexit,	much	less	attention	has	focused	on	the	Brexit-views	of	Europeans	in	the
remaining	member	states.
This	blog	post,	therefore,	sheds	light	on	the	question	of	what	voters	in	the	EU-27	think	about	Brexit	and	the	Brexit
negotiations.	It	is	based	on	an	EU-wide	online	poll	designed	by	myself	and	conducted	by	Dalia	Research	for	the
University	of	Zürich	in	July	2017.	The	sample	consists	of	9,371	working-age	respondents	(ages	18-65),	drawn
across	the	remaining	27	EU	Member	States,	with	sample	sizes	roughly	proportional	to	their	population	size.
This	data	shows	that	Brexit	is	an	issue	that	a	majority	of	Europeans	care	about:	46	per	cent	of	the	Europeans
surveyed	said	that	they	followed	Brexit	a	little,	and	18	per	cent	expressed	a	strong	interest	in	Brexit	(compared
with	42	per	cent	and	37	per	cent,	respectively,	in	the	UK).	To	the	extent	that	domestic	public	opinion	constrains
the	negotiation	space	of	the	EU-27	governments,	it	is	thus	worthwhile	to	examine	what	EU-27	citizens	think	about
Brexit.
To	this	end,	I	will	focus	on	three	questions:
Does	the	EU	public	support	the	hard	negotiating	stance	pursued	by	the	EU	in	the	Brexit	negotiations?
How	do	EU	citizens	evaluate	the	effects	of	Brexit	on	the	UK,	the	EU,	and	their	own	country?
To	what	extent	do	spillover	effects	exist	between	the	Brexit	negotiations	and	exit	preferences	in	other
member	states?
Does	the	EU	public	support	the	hard	negotiating	stance	pursued	by	the	EU	in	the	Brexit	negotiations?
Overall,	the	European	public	seems	to	agree	with	the	uncompromising	line	of	the	European	Commission	on
Brexit.	A	plurality	of	respondents	(42	per	cent)	favour	a	somewhat	or	very	hard	line.	This	means	that	they	think
the	EU	should	insist	that	the	UK	pay	a	large	“exit	bill”	to	compensate	for	the	costs	of	Brexit,	guarantee	special
rights	for	EU	citizens	living	in	the	UK,	and	should	not	give	the	UK	privileged	access	to	the	European	single
market.	The	preference	for	a	hard	stance	increases	the	more	interested	respondents	are	in	Brexit.	Among	those
who	follow	Brexit	a	lot,	almost	two-thirds	(62	per	cent)	support	a	hard	line.	In	contrast,	only	12	per	cent	of
respondents	think	that	the	EU	should	approach	the	exit	negotiations	with	the	UK	with	a	soft	line,	defined	as
accepting	a	small	“exit	bill,”	limits	on	the	rights	of	EU	citizens	currently	living	in	the	UK,	and	privileged	access	for
the	UK	to	the	European	single	market.
Figure	1:	Public	opinion	on	the	EU’s	negotiation	strategy	in	the	Brexit	negotiations
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Despite	some	differences	across	countries,	the	support	for	a	hard	negotiating	position	is	also	strong	when	we
look	at	individual	countries.	Figure	2	shows	the	results	for	the	five	largest	EU-27	countries.	Support	for	a	soft	line
is	low	in	all	of	them,	and	with	the	exception	of	Poland,	a	hard	line	is	the	most	popular	negotiation	strategy.	Among
those	who	are	interested	in	Brexit	a	lot,	those	in	favour	of	a	hard	line	even	constitute	a	majority	in	all	five
countries,	including	Poland.	Moreover,	contrary	to	the	hope	of	some	leading	Brexiteers	that	Germany	and	Spain
would	lobby	in	the	UK’s	favour	lest	jobs	in	the	German	car	or	Spanish	tourism	industry	be	lost,	the	German	and
especially	Spanish	public	is	taking	a	rather	hard	line:	48	per	cent	of	German	respondents	and	62	per	cent	of
Spanish	respondents	support	a	somewhat	or	very	hard	EU	position	in	the	Brexit	negotiations.
Figure	2:	Preferred	EU	negotiation	strategy	in	the	five	largest	EU-27	states
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Source:	Compiled	by	the	author
These	findings	suggest	the	current	EU	negotiating	strategy	pursued	by	Michel	Barnier	is	based	on	a	broad
consensus	among	the	EU	public.	From	this	perspective,	it	is	not	surprising	that	British	attempts	to	bypass	the	EU
institutions	by	appealing	directly	to	EU	leaders	have	failed,	or	that	Brexit	is	not	a	highly	contested	issue	in	the
remaining	part	of	the	EU.
How	do	EU	citizens	evaluate	the	effects	of	Brexit	on	the	UK,	the	EU,	and	their	own	country?
The	economies	and	societies	of	the	UK	and	the	remaining	27	EU	member	states	are	strongly	intertwined.	Brexit
will	thus	invariably	affect	everyone	involved	in	the	Brexit	process:	the	UK,	the	remaining	member	states,	and	the
EU.	But	how	do	the	public	in	the	remaining	EU-27	states	assess	these	effects?
Figure	3	shows	what	respondents	think	about	the	medium-term	consequences	of	Brexit.	Three	findings	stand	out.
First,	many	Europeans	do	not	think	that	Brexit	will	bring	significant	changes	over	the	next	five	years,	especially
not	outside	the	UK.	Less	than	20	per	cent	of	respondents	think	that	Brexit	will	make	the	UK,	the	EU,	or	their	own
country	much	worse	or	much	better	off.
Second,	many	Europeans	are	oblivious	to	their	own	country’s	vulnerability	to	Brexit:	44	per	cent	think	that	Brexit
will	neither	benefit,	nor	hurt	their	country,	and	this	rate	is	the	same	among	those	with	a	strong	interest	in	Brexit.
This	suggests	that	public	opinion	on	Brexit	could	still	shift	quite	a	bit	as	the	effects	of	Brexit	become	clearer	to
voters.	Finally,	to	the	extent	that	they	do	expect	Brexit	to	have	an	effect,	more	people	see	these	effects	as
negative	for	everyone	involved.	Nonetheless,	a	significant	number	of	respondents	also	see	upsides	to	Brexit,
notably	for	the	UK	itself.
Figure	3:	Expected	medium-term	effect	of	Brexit	on	the	UK,	the	EU,	and	respondents’	own	country
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Note:	Due	to	the	presence	of	‘don’t	know’	responses,	the	percentages	do	not	add	up	to	100.
Yet	this	also	masks	considerable	differences	among	the	EU	member	states.	Figure	4	shows	that	in	some
countries,	such	as	Poland	and	Germany,	the	public	is	quite	aware	of	the	possible	negative	consequences	and
opportunities	of	Brexit	for	their	own	country.	In	other	countries,	such	as	France,	the	opinion	that	Brexit	will	not
have	much	effect	on	the	country’s	future	dominates.
Figure	4:	Expected	medium-term	effect	of	Brexit	on	the	five	largest	EU-27	member	states
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To	what	extent	do	spillover	effects	exist	between	the	Brexit	negotiations	and	exit	preferences	in	other
member	states?
Voters’	expectations	about	the	effects	of	Brexit	matter	for	the	Brexit	negotiations	because	they	widen	or	constrain
policymakers’	room	for	manoeuvre.	But	they	also	matter	because	these	expectations	(and	eventually,	the	actual
trajectory)	are	likely	to	feed	back	into	their	own	assessments	about	the	viability	of	leaving	the	EU.
In	the	negotiations	with	the	UK,	the	EU-27	governments,	therefore,	face	an	“accommodation	dilemma“.	In
principle,	as	many	Leavers	rightly	emphasise,	the	EU-27	have	strong	incentives	to	grant	the	UK	continued	access
to	the	EU’s	single	market	in	order	to	minimise	the	disruptions	of	Brexit	at	home.	Yet	if	this	accommodation	of	the
Brexit-vote	creates	incentives	for	other	countries	to	leave	as	well,	such	a	response	might	put	the	entire	European
project	at	risk	in	the	long	run.	After	all,	a	sizeable	proportion	of	Europeans	(28	per	cent	in	my	data)	say	that	they
would	probably	or	definitely	vote	to	leave	the	EU	if	their	own	country	were	to	hold	an	EU-exit	referendum.	The
rationale	for	the	current	hard,	non-accommodation	strategy	vis-à-vis	the	UK	is	thus	rooted	in	the	hope	that	such	a
hard	line	will	discourage	further	efforts	at	disintegration.	But	is	this	hope	warranted?
To	examine	this	question,	I	analyse	how	respondents’	views	about	the	likely	consequences	of	Brexit	for	the	UK
are	related	to	their	likelihood	of	voting	leave	in	a	potential	exit	referendum.	Figure	5	shows	that	those	who	are
more	pessimistic	about	the	effects	of	Brexit	for	the	UK	are	between	ten	and	twenty	per	cent	less	likely	to	vote	in
favour	of	leaving	the	EU.	In	contrast,	those	who	are	more	optimistic	about	Britain’s	prospects	outside	the	EU	are
much	more	likely	to	support	an	EU-exit	of	their	own	country.	Notably,	this	analysis	accounts	for	respondents’
general	opinion	of	the	EU	–	even	among	respondents	with	a	similar	opinion	of	the	EU,	differences	in	expected
effects	of	Brexit	translate	into	different	propensities	of	voting	leave.
Figure	5:	Link	between	expectations	about	the	effects	of	Brexit	for	the	UK	and	potential	leave-vote	in
other	EU-27	countries
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Note:	The	calculation	controls	for	age,	education,	gender,	rural/urban,	and	country	factors.	For	all	respondents	there	was	an
additional	control	for	opinions	toward	the	EU.
Because	this	relationship	is	most	pronounced	among	those	with	a	negative	or	neutral	opinion	of	the	EU,	this
suggests	that	the	accommodation	dilemma	is	real.	A	hard	Brexit	will	hurt	the	member	states.	But	the	remaining
EU-27	governments	are	also	right	to	worry	that	allowing	the	UK	to	have	its	cake	and	eat	it,	too,	and	to	prosper,	as
a	result,	risks	a	profound	destabilisation	of	the	EU.	Public	opinion	on	Brexit	thus	matters	–	but	citizens	in	the
remaining	member	states	matter	as	much	for	the	Brexit	negotiations	as	the	British	public.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	originally	appeared	at	our	sister	site,	LSE	Brexit.	It	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	not	the	position
of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the	London	School	of	Economics.
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